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I. INTRODUCTION

"When you use 'xerox' the way you use 'aspirin,' the advertisement reads,
'we get a headache."" Much like the Xerox Corporation, Google has
sustained quite the headache over the years due to threats of genericide.2
Genericide is a phenomenon in which a business can lose trademark
protection of its otherwise incontestable mark.3 A trademark is a symbol
used in the marketplace that identifies a distinct source of goods or services.4
Google is a well-known trademark, but dictionaries often define the word
"google" as a verb, meaning to search something online.5 In addition, the
word "google" was frequently used as a verb in both casual conversation and
in the media.6 Moreover, as one of the most valuable brands, Google7 has

1. See Timothy J. Lockhart, Did You Know ...

There's a Trademark Graveyard?,

INTABULL. (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/DidYouKnowTh
eresaTrademarkGraveyard.aspx (describing Xerox Corporation's advertising campaign
to combat genericide and alluding to the loss of trademark protection for the mark
"aspirin" due to genericide).
2. See Jeff John Roberts, Is 'Google' Generic? Supreme Court May Decide,
FORTUNE, (Aug. 21, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/21/google-trademark-supremecourt/ (reporting that the plaintiffs in Elliott v. Google filed a petition to the United States
Supreme Court to overturn the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's ruling that
protected Google, Inc.'s trademark from genericide).
3. See 1 JEROME GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS
§ 2.02 (2017) (defining genericide as the evolution of a trademark's meaning from a
single source of products to a word of the product itself).
4. See What Is Trade-Mark, L. DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/trademark/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2018) (defining a trademark as "[a] distinctive mark, motto,
device, or emblem, which a manufacturer stamps, prints, or otherwise affixes to the
goods he produces, so that they may be identified in the market, and their origin be

vouched for.").
5. See Jacob Gershman, Yes, 'Google'Is UsedAs a Verb, But It's Still a Trademark
Court Says, WALL ST. J. (May 16, 2017, 7:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nogoogling-on-bing-search-leader-avoids-genericide-in-trademark-case-1494976044
(listing ways that the trademark "Google" is used as a generic verb "to search for
something online").

6. Id.
7. See Julien Rath, The 10 Most Valuable Brands in the World, Bus. INSIDER (Apr.
1, 2017, 9:12 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/brand-finance-10-most-valuablebrands-in-the-world-2017-3 (ranking ten companies using financial and business
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good reason to be concerned.' With a brand worth $109.4 billion,9 it is no
wonder that Google needs an aspirin or two.
However, both Google and the Xerox Corporation now have another form
of relief.'o The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in Elliott
v. Google, Inc.," that the Google trademark did not fall prey to genericide
because (1) the claim of genericide did not relate to a good or service and (2)
Google's verb usage does not automatically constitute a generic use. 12 The
Ninth Circuit's holding contrasts with the traditional tenet of genericism
avoidance: do not use the trademark as a noun or verb.' 3 The protection of
the Google trademark, despite the mark's generic verb usage, is significant.14
On October 16, 2017, the United States Supreme Court denied the plaintiff s
petition for certiorari, which asked the Court to consider whether the test for
primary significance is the Ninth Circuit's "majority understanding" test or
the "majority usage" test utilized by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.
This Comment will analyze the effect of the Elliott decision on the
phenomenon of genericide and generic trademarks. Part II will discuss the
Lanham Act, the inherent distinctiveness of trademarks, and the cancellation
of trademarks. It will also discuss the Elliott holding and the Ninth Circuit's
variation of the primary significance test. Part III will apply the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning in Elliott to both the Xerox Corporation trademark as it

performance data and interviews with over three million consumers).
8. See Simon Tulett, 'Genericide': Brands Destroyedby Their Own Success, BBC
NEWS (May 28, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-27026704 (stating that a
brand is usually "the most valuable asset of a company").
9. See Rath, supra note 7 (ranking Google as the most valuable brand in the world).
10. See Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1163 (9th Cir. 2017) (exemplifying
that Google's trademark was challenged on the basis of genericide).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1156.
13. See GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 3, § 2.02(b) (including "do not use the
trademark as a noun or a verb" in a checklist for preventing loss of distinctiveness).
14. See Eric Goldman, Google Gets Big Ninth Circuit Win That Its Eponymous
TrademarkIsn't Generic - Elliott v. Google, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (May 16, 2017),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/20l17/05/google-gets-big-ninth-circuit-win-thatits-eponymous-trademark-isnt-generic-elliott-v-google.htm (stating that the Elliott
decision is a big win for companies with well-known brands whose marks are used as
nouns or verbs); see also Wirtz Law APC, GOOGLE Trademark Still at Risk: U.S.
Supreme Court Review Sought by Wirtz Law APC in Case Seeking Cancellation of
GOOGLE Trademark, Bus. WIRE (Aug. 17, 2017, 3:43 PM), http://www.businesswire.
com/news/home/20170817005962/en/GOOGLE-Trademark-Risk-U.S.-SupremeCourt-Review (reporting the plaintiffs petition for certiorari to the Court in Elliott).
15. See Elliott, 860 F.3d 1154, cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 362 (2017) (presenting the two
genericide questions and one evidence question to the U.S. Supreme Court).
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pertains to genericide and the facts presented in Booking.com B. V. v. Matal,16
as it relates to genericness. Part IV will recommend that the evidence of
indiscriminate verb usage should not be used as evidence of genericism or
genericide in trademark disputes involving domain names. Finally, this
Comment will recommend that the Internet era requires a strict application
of the primary significance test.
II. THE GENERICIDE DOCTRINE: LOSING YOUR MARK TO THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN

A. What Is a Trademark?

'

A trademark is a term, symbol, object, or a sensation that is legally
protected if it is connected to a unique source of a good or service and
distinguishes that source from other sources.' 7 Trademark protection is a
particularly important property right because it authenticates the quality of a
product or service from a particular source and makes it easier for consumers
to decide which good or service they want to use." Without this protection,
the public would be vulnerable to both confusion and deception in the
economy.' 9 The Lanham Act was enacted in 1946 to regulate and protect
trademarks for the purpose of promoting competition, clarity, and fostering
the goodwill of businesses in the marketplace.2 0 The Act defines the word
"trademark" as any word, symbol, or device that is used or is intended to be
used, in commerce, to distinguish goods and indicate the source of the
goods. 2
As the language in the statute indicates, trademark protection requires a
16. No. 1:16-cv-00425 (LMB/IDD), 2017 WL 3425167, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9,
2017).
17. See GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 3, § 1.02 (noting the Lanham Act definition
is consistent with definitions under federal law and at common law before the Lanham
Act was adopted).
18. See id. § 1.03 (explaining that trademarks communicate quality of goods, good
will or function as an advertising until it has an association with a particular source).
19. See id. (stating that trademarks assure consumers that what they bought from the
source before will be the same product or of the same quality when they go back to
purchase more).

20. See Park 'n Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1984) (explaining
Congress' conclusion that national trademark protection is important); see also GILSON
& LALONDE, supra note 3, § 1.02 (stating that the adoption of the Lanham Act brought
precise definitions to basic trademark law that decreased uncertainty in interpreting the
law).

21. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012); see also GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 3, § 1.02
(noting that the statutory definition of trademark is "virtually limitless," as suggested by
the word "includes" in the direct quotation of the trademark definition in the Lanham
Act).
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single source be tied to a good by consumers, in order to distinguish the
goods.22 Therefore, to be eligible for protection under the Lanham Act, a
trademark must be distinctive.23 A trademark can either be inherently
distinctive or it may acquire distinctiveness through secondary meaning. 24
B. The Lanham Act, the Inherently DistinctiveRequirement, and the
Development of the GenericideDoctrine

There are four categories of distinctiveness: "(1) generic; (2) descriptive;
(3) suggestive; and (4) arbitrary or fanciful." 25 A generic mark refers to a
category where the good belongs.26 An example of a generic mark is a "PingPong Paddle" for a brand that sells ping-pong paddles.2 7 Conversely, a
descriptive mark can only be protected through evidence of the
distinctiveness of the applicant's goods. 28 An example of a descriptive mark
is "American Ping-Pong Paddle" because the mark describes the particular
ping-pong paddle brand as being American. 29 A suggestive mark is a
protectable mark that requires imagination to reach a conclusion about its
source. 30
Arbitrary and fanciful marks are afforded the strongest
protection. 3' Arbitrary marks are common words attached in an unfamiliar
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (stating that a mark that distinguishes its goods from other
sources will be given trademark registration).
23. See Daniel E. Mangis, When Almost Famous Just Isn't Famous Enough:
UnderstandingFame in the Federal TrademarkDilution Act as a Term ofArt Requiring
Minimal Distinctiveness, 21 REV. LITIG. 455, 458 (2000) (citing Abercrombie & Fitch
Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976)) (stating that trademarks must
be distinctive to be eligible for protection).
24. See id. at 459 (citing Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 1, 33 (1999)) (defining secondary meaning (also referred to as acquired
distinctiveness) as "the public's association of a once independent word or symbol with
a product that transforms the word of symbol into a distinctive mark").
25. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9 (describing the four categories of
distinctiveness); see also GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 3, § 2.01 (laying out the four
categories on the trademark distinctiveness spectrum that were originally articulated by
Judge Friendly in Abercrombie & Fitch Co).
26. See id. ("[O]ne that refers, or has come to be understood as referring, to the genus
of which the particular product is a species.").
27. See Mangis, supra note 23, at 458.
28. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10; see also Mangis, supranote 23, at 459 (noting
that, unlike a generic mark, a descriptive mark can gain distinctiveness through
secondary meaning).
29. Mangis, supra note 23, at 459.
30. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11; see also Jake Linford, The False Dichotomy
Between Suggestive and Descriptive Trademarks, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367, 1371 (2015)
(explaining that according to trademark doctrine, a suggestive mark is "inherently
distinctive because there is a weak connection between" the source and the good).
31. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11.
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way.32 Fanciful marks are words that were solely invented for their use as
trademarks.3 3
The Lanham Act allows for a mark's cancellation if the mark "becomes
the generic name for the goods or services . . . for which it is registered."3 4
Even if a secondary meaning is proven for the newly generic mark, it is still
not enough to make that mark protectable.3 5 When the public primarily
understands a former trademark as the name of a good and not the source of
a good, genericide occurs.36
Historically, genericide cases have primarily turned on whether the mark
passed into the public domain.3 7 Courts analyzed evidence of (1) alternative
generic terms for the mark;38 (2) what the mark meant to the public;39 and
(3) evidence of generic and descriptive use without any indication of the
good's origin. 40 Even when companies try to reclaim marks from the public
domain, courts hold that the mark is generic.4 ' When a company in one case
used their trademark to describe their product, rather than just indicate its
source, the mark fell victim to genericide.4 2 In addition, a company's failure
to police its own mark is taken into account.43

32. Id. at n.12; see also Linford, supra note 30, at 1376 (using as an example for an
arbitrary mark the registered trademark "Apple" for computers).
33. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at n.12; see also Linford, supra note 30, at 1376 (giving
the registered trademark "Xerox" for photocopiers as an example of an arbitrary mark).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012).
35. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9; see also Linford, supranote 30, at 1378 (stating that
courts and scholars presume a mark that is used as the name of a product cannot serve as
a signifying mark, even public sees the term as a trademark).
36. See, e.g., Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing
Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)); Freecycle Network,
Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2007); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods.
Co., 85 F.2d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1936).
37. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir.
1963) ("thermos"); DuPont Cellophane Co., 85 F.2d at 81 ("cellophane"); Bayer Co.,
272 F. at 512 ("aspirin"); Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 80
(Dec. Comm'r Pat. 1950) ("escalator").
38. Bayer Co., 272 F. at 510.
39. DuPont Cellophane Co., 85 F.2d at 77.
40. Haughton Elevator Co., 85 U.S.P.Q (BNA) at 80.
41. See Bayer Co., 272 F. at 510 (holding that it was too late to reclaim the trademark
",aspirin" once the public learned to know the trademark as the name of the drug).
42. See DuPont Cellophane Co., 85 F.2d at 78 (holding that the trademark
",cellophane" was now generic because Plaintiff had used the mark as a descriptive term
in advertising and was referred to in a generic sense in industry magazines).
43. See King-Seeley Thermos Co., 321 F.2d at 579 (stating that King-Seeley failed
police its trademark because it did not actively seek out generic use of "thermos" by nontrade publications).
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C. The Primary Significance Test: Secondary Meaning, the "Who-AreYou/What-Are-You" Test and the Elliott Decision
Under the Lanham Act, the test for determining genericism is finding the
primary significance of the mark to the public.44 The primary significance
of a trademark is also used in the test for determining secondary meaning. 4 5
A descriptive mark, which is not inherently distinctive, can acquire
distinctiveness through secondary meaning and, thus, become a protectable
trademark. 46 The Supreme Court held "secondary meaning is acquired when
in 'the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature ...
is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself."' 47 In
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,48 the Supreme Court writes regarding
section 43 in the Lanham Act "to establish a trade name in the term 'shredded
wheat' the plaintiff must show more than a subordinate meaning which
applies to it. It must show that the primary significance of the term in the
minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer." 49
The green-gold color trademark in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products
Co.,5o developed secondary meaning because customers identified the greengold color as the Plaintiffs mark.5 ' Thus, the color identified the product's
source and was protected through acquired distinctiveness. 52
Direct
evidence of secondary meaning can include: (1) trial testimony; (2)
affidavits; (3) survey and statistical data; and (4) unsolicited consumer
response and testimonials. 53 A variety of other factors, considered as indirect
evidence, include: (1) extent or amount of advertising; (2) extent of sales of

44. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012) ("The primary significance of the registered
mark to the relevant public [is] . . . the test for determining whether the registered mark
has become . . . generic.").

45. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995) (holding that
a color can serve as a trademark through acquired distinctiveness by a showing of
secondary meaning).
46. See id. (explaining that when a brand's mark attains secondary meaning, the
brand is distinguished a particular brand and indicates a source).
47. Id.; see also David E. Rigney, Annotation, Application of Secondary Meaning
Test in Action for Trademark or Tradename Infringement Under § 43(a) of the Lanham

Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)), 86 A.L.R. Fed. 489 (1988) ("[I]t is not necessary that the
public know who or what the source really is.").

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938).
Id. at 118.
514 U.S. at 166.
Id.
Id.

53. See Rigney, supra note 47, at 18 (listing types of direct evidence the courts have
relied on to determine secondary meaning).
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the product or service; 54 (3) nature and extent of unsolicited media coverage
that the product or service has received; (4) extent and nature of copying and
third party use of the mark; and (5) length of use of the mark.5 5 The Court's
articulation of the primary significance test for secondary meaning of a
trademark is instructive for the issues of genericide and genericness. 56
Circuit courts have developed multiple tests for analyzing the primary
significance of a term. 7 The tests can overlap with one another and some
circuits use a combination of different tests.5 ' The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit's primary significance test will not initiate the test until it
decides on the mark's genus59 at issue.60 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit determines the genus of the product first and then establishes
the primary significance of the term to the public when used for said genus
of products. 6 ' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit states the
primary significance to the relevant public is their ability to identify the
nature of the good, not its source. 62 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth

&

54. See id. (giving success or popularity of a product or service, and the nature of the
sales as examples of showing "extent of sales of the product or service).
55. See id. at 19 (listing indirect evidence of secondary meaning that courts will
consider in their determination of secondary meaning).
56. See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc.,
456 U.S. 844, 851 (1982)) ('"Secondary meaning' is acquired when 'in the minds of the
public, the primary significance of a product feature ... is to identify the source of the
product rather than the product itself."'); Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1156
(9th Cir. 2017) (stating that a term becomes generic when the primary significance of the
mark to the public is the name for a particular good, regardless of its source).
57. See Scott Brown, Note, "I Tweeted on Facebook Today:" Re-Evaluating
Trademark Genericide of Internet-Based Trademarks, 7 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO.
Soc'Y 457, 461 (2012) (explaining the Second Circuit's substantial majority test and the
Ninth Circuit's "Who-Are-You/What-Are-You?" test as examples of slightly different
standards for testing primary significance).
58. See GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 3, § 2.02(6)(0a) (describing how courts have
used more specific language to determine whether a mark is generic).
59. See Genus, DICTONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/genus?s=t
(last visited Feb. 9, 2018) (defining "genus" as a "class or group of individuals, or of
species of individuals").
60. See GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 3 § 2.02(6)(b) (describing different types of
primary significance tests and highlighting a test that invokes genus-species language).
61. See Nartron Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 305 F.3d 397, 404 (6th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Blinded Veterans Ass'n v. Blinded Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1041 (D.C.
Cir. 1989)) (stating that the appropriate test for genericness is whether the relevant public
perceives the term primarily as the designation of the article); see also GILSON
LALONDE, supra note 3 § 2.02(6)(e) (describing the Sixth Circuit test for genericness).
62. See Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir.
2008)) (defining the legal standard of the genericism analysis as determining the primary
significance of the mark to the relevant public); see also GILSON & LALONDE, supra note
3 § 2.02(6)(e) (describing the First Circuit test for genericness).
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Circuit's test also stipulates that a generic term's primary significance must
indicate the class of the product or service to the relevant consuming public,
not its source.63 The Second Circuit's primary significance test involves a
showing that the term is an indication of the nature of the article, rather than
an indication of its origin.6 4 The Ninth Circuit articulated the "Who-AreYou/What-Are-You" test in Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss.6 5 The court
stated the test as follows: "A mark answers the buyer's questions 'Who are
you? Where do you come from?' 'Who vouches for you?' But the name of a
product answers the question 'What are you?' 6 6 If the type of product is
described instead of the producer, the trademark is deemed generic. 6 7
In Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian JournalPublications, Inc.,6 8 the
Ninth Circuit rejected a broad reading of Surgicenters of America, Inc. v.
Medical Dental SurgerieS69 and held that the combination of the two generic
marks (in this case "Filipino" and "yellow pages") did not automatically
make the resulting combination generic. 70 However, the court still found that
the plaintiff s trademark was generic or, in the most favorable reading of the
evidence, was descriptive without secondary meaning.7 ' The court reasoned
that if faced with the "What are you?" question under the test, the various
Filipino directories would answer: "A Filipino yellow pages." 72

&

63. See Glover v. Ampak, Inc., 74 F.3d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that "[w]hen
a trademark ceases to identify in the public's mind the particular source of a product or
service but rather identifies a class of product or service, regardless of source, that mark
has become generic and is lost as an enforceable trademark"); see also GILSON
LALONDE, supra note 3 § 2.02(6)(e) (describing the Fourth Circuit test for genericness).
64. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir.
1963) (stating that to become generic, a mark must indicate the class of a good, not the
origin of the good); GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 3 § 2.02(6)(e) (describing the
Second Circuit test for genericness).
65. 6 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993).
66. Id. (quoting 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12.01 (3d

ed. 1992); see Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ'ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143,
1147 (illustrating a test to distinguish unprotectable generic marks that describe a class
of good (answers "What-Are-You?") and protectable marks that describe the producer
of a good (answers "Who-Are-You?")).
67. See Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147 (quoting Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v.
Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 611 F.2d 296, 304 (9th Cir. 1979)) ("[I]f the primary significance
of the trademark is to describe the type ofproduct rather than the producer,the trademark
[is] a generic term and [cannot be] a valid trademark.").
68. Id.
69. 601 F.2d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that the mark "Surgicenter" was
generic or descriptive without secondary meaning).
70. Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1148.
71. Id. at 1151-52.
72. Id at 1151.
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In Yellow Cab Co. v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc.,7 the Ninth Circuit
held that the response to "what are you?" was expected to be "a taxicab
company" or "a cab company." 74 Additionally, it was suggested that by
asking to refer to the yellow cab company, a company was likely to point to
a business operating under the name "Yellow Cab."75 As a result, summary
judgment was reversed because the "who-are-you?" question was a genuine
issue of material fact. 76
In the Elliott case, the Ninth Circuit held that the lower court correctly
applied the primary significance test.7 7 The plaintiffs acquired 763 domain
names that included the word "google" and sought to cancel Google's mark
because it became a generic term for searching the Internet.7 ' The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that without making a claim with regard to a particular type
of good, arbitrary marks could not be protected.7 9 Without the connection to
the particular good or service, an arbitrary mark for one product could be
deemed generic because it is generic as applied to a completely different
product.so
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Elliott's argument that verb usage
automatically constituted genericism." The court affirmed the lower court's
articulation of indiscriminate verb usage and discriminate verb usage.8 2
Since the claim "must relate to a particular type of good," the court held that

73. 419 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2005).
74. See id. at 929-30 (explaining that the question "Who-are-you?" was a question
of fact and that summary judgment was improperly granted).
75. Id. at 929.
76. See id. at 929-30 (noting that the plaintiff provided evidence that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether "yellow cab" was generic or, in the
alternative, descriptive without secondary meaning).
77. See Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1163 (9th Cir. 2017) ("The district
court did not misapply the primary significance test. . . .").
78. See id. at 1154-55 (stating the plaintiffs filed an action to cancel the "Google"
trademark after the National Arbitration Forum ("NAF") transferred the plaintiffs'
domain names to Google in 2012, after Google filed their lawsuit).
79. See id. at 1156-57 (holding that the Lanham Act requires a link between a claim
of genericide and a particular good or service under the primary significance test).
80. See id. at 1157 (using "IVORY" as an example of a mark that could be cancelled
because it is generic for tusks of elephants but arbitrary for soap).
81. See id. at 1157-58 (stating that Congress's intent when amending the Lanham
Act was to specify "that a speaker might use a trademark as the name for a product, i.e.,
as a noun, and yet use the mark with a particular source in mind, i.e., as a trademark").
82. See id. at 1158 (defining indiscriminate verb usage as use of a mark with no
particular source in mind and defining discriminate verb usage as use of a mark with a
source in mind). The court further recognized that a consumer may use the word
"google" with no particular search engine in mind (i.e., indiscriminate) or may use the
trademark with the Google search engine in mind (i.e., discriminate). Id.
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the assumption under which the public uses a mark in a generic and
indiscriminate sense is irrelevant to determining how the public primarily
understands the mark itself.83 Further, the court found Elliott's evidence of
indiscriminate verb usage by consumers, the media, and Google employees,
to be insufficient.8 4
D. Headaches of Genericism: Booking.com and the Xerox Corporation

The Elliott decision's effect on genericness and genericide will be played
out in the future." In Booking.com, the plaintiff company appealed the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's ("TTAB") decision that their mark
"Booking.com" is generic.86 The mark in this case was being used by a travel
and accommodations site that offers travel and accommodations services. 7
The plaintiff argued that the mark cannot be used in a grammatically
coherent way to refer generically to anything." In other words, one cannot
refer to something as a "Booking.com" or use "Booking.com" as a verb.8 9
The TTAB in Booking.com argued the mark's use is irrelevant. 90 On appeal,
the court held that the mark "Booking.com" was descriptive with secondary
meaning and, thus, was protectable. 9' The court also noted that evidence
indicating consumer use, such as referring to services as "booking.coms,"
was relevant in its analysis. 92

83. See id. at 1157-59 (stating that the Ninth Circuit has already rejected the theory
that trademarks can only be used as adjectives).
84. See id. at 1161-62 (holding that the dictionary evidence only showing secondary
definitions was insufficient for a finding of genericide and that there was an efficient
alternative for the word "google" because the other internet search engine competitors
do not call their searches a "google").
85. See Goldman, supra note 14 (stating that the Elliott decision was a big win for
trademark owners because the ruling makes genericide challenges more difficult).
86. See Kat Greene, Booking.com Demands Better Answers from USPTO, LAW360
(Sept. 6, 2016, 5:51 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/836232 (summarizing
Booking.com's appeal of the TTAB's decision).
87. Id.
88. See Complaint ¶ 41, Booking.com B.V. v. Lee, No. 1:16-cv-00425 (LMB/IDD),
2017 WL 3425167 (E.D. Va. Apr. 15, 2016) (stating that there is no evidence that any
consumers refer to sites as "Booking.com's").
89. See Greene, supra note 86.
90. See Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, No. 1:16-cv-425 (LMB/IDD), 2017 WL
3425167, at *11, * 16 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2017) (relying on the Federal Circuit's statement
in a case involving the denial of registration to "Mattress.com" and a genericness test);
see also H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int'l Ass'n Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989-90
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining how the Federal Circuit concluded that use is irrelevant
based on the test of genericness).
91. Booking.com, No. 2017 WL 3425167, at *1, *20, *23.
92. Id. at *20.
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The district court held that alone, the word "booking," was generic for the
classes of hotel and travel reservation services because competitors use the
word "booking" to describe making a reservation.93 However, the mark at
issue in this case was "Booking.com," and not "booking." 9 4 As a result, the
court analyzed the impact of the top level domain ".com" on the mark and
determined that top level domains are source identifying. Additionally, a
mark with a generic second level domain (e.g. "booking") and a top level
domain (e.g. ".com") can be protected if it has acquired distinctiveness.95
The court noted the absence of evidence of public use of the term
"booking.com" and rejected the plaintiffs argument, supported by a
statement from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that use of
a mark to determine genericness "is irrelevant."96 In determining that
"booking.com" is descriptive with secondary meaning, the court primarily
relied on evidence that consumers understand the mark to be a brand.9 7 After
analyzing the plaintiffs survey,98 the court concluded that the defendants
had not established that "Booking.com" is generic and that the mark is in
fact descriptive.99 In addition, the court held the mark "Booking.com" is
descriptive with secondary meaning after analyzing other surveys provided
by the plaintiff, advertisements, sales, media coverage, length and
exclusivity of use, and social media following.' 0 0
The Xerox Corporation's brand stands to be the most affected by the
application of the Ninth Circuit's primary significance test combined with
its ruling on verb usage in genericism and genericide cases.' 0 ' The Xerox
93. Id. at *7.

94. Id. at *9.
95. Id. at * 1l (stating that the court declines to rely on Federal Circuit precedent that
".com" has no source identifying significance and instead approaching the genericness
of ".com" as an issue of first impression).
96. See id. at * 16 (relying on the Federal Circuit's statement in a case involving the
denial of registration to "Mattress.com" and a genericness test).
97. Id. at *17-20, *22-23 (stating the survey indicated that 74.8% of consumers of
online travel services recognize BOOKING.COM as a brand and dismissing the
defendants' arguments that (1) genericness inquiries are not relevant when the term was
commonly used prior to being a mark; (2) ".com" marks should be tested without the
".com;" (3) that there are methodological flaws in the survey pertaining to the survey
population, not accounting for the ability to distinguish ".com" common names and
".com" brand names and the order in which the marks were presented in the survey).
98. See id. (reproducing the tables used in the survey results, and discussing the
defendants' expert's critiques).
99. See id. at *19 ("[T]he Court finds that the relevant consuming public primarily
understands that BOOKING.COM does not refer to a genus, rather it is descriptive of
services involving "booking" available at that domain name.").
100. Id. at *20-23.
101. See Goldman, supra note 14 (stating that the Elliott decision is a win for "[b]ig
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trademark was in danger of becoming generic before the corporation ran an
aggressive ad campaign to view the mark as a name that indicates the source
of their products and services, not a name for the service itself. 02 Despite
the risk of becoming their mark is generic, Xerox has so far avoided
genericide.' 03 There are several brands of photocopiers on the market:
Hewlett Packard, Canon, Epson, Brother, Dell and, of course, Xerox.1 0 4
There are fifteen search results in a search for "Xerox" using Hewlett
Packard's search engine but all of the results use the mark to describe a
product affiliated with the Xerox Corporation.o"
In Canon's "About
Section" on their website, there is no mention of the mark "Xerox."' 06 In the
Canon's website's search engine, there are thirteen results for the term
"Xerox" but all of the results refer to the company itself. 7 Epson's "About
Section" does not use the mark "Xerox" and have no search results for the
mark in its search engine.'0 o In Brother's "About Section" there is no
mention of the mark Xerox and no search results for the mark in the website's
search engine.' 09 Finally, Dell's "About Page" does not mention the mark
[t]rademark [o]wners"); see also Best Global Brands 2016 Ranking, INTERBRAND,
http://interbrand.com/best-brands/best-global-brands/2016/ranking/#?listFormat=ls (last
visited Jan. 30, 2018) (ranking Xerox as the 84th brand in 2016).
102. See Gary H. Fechter & Elina Slavin, Practical Tips on Avoiding Genericide,
INTABULL. (Nov. 15, 2011), https://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/PracticalTipson
AvoidingGenericide.aspx (explaining how companies use advertising to prevent the
genericide of their trademarks).
103. See id. (suggesting that because Xerox's mark has not been deemed generic, it
seems the ad campaign to combat genericide was successful).
104. All-In-One Printers, STAPLES, https://www.staples.com/Printers/catCL167883/
8msca?fids=&pn=2&sr=true&sby=&min=&max= (last visited Feb. 9, 2018).
105. Search Results for Xerox, HP, http://www8.hp.com/us/en/search/searchresults.html?ajaxpage=1#/page=1&/qt=xerox (last visited Feb. 9, 2018) (input "xerox"
into website's search engine).
106. About Canon, CANON GLOB., http://global.canon/en/about/index.html (last
visited Feb. 9, 2018).
107. Search Results for Xerox, CANON GLOB., http://search.global.canon/enall/
search.x?q=xerox&ie=utf8&cat=0&pagemax=10&imgsize=3&pdf=ok&zoom
=0&sort=0&ctor=0&1for=0&ref=search.global.canon&pid=ZRsqlrjuo2aBqs
SxxGm5TQ..&qid=Oei3 1Wq98raDXtOhdlise0Xm9Eg3JO2D&page=1 (last visited Feb.
9, 2018) (input "xerox" into website's search engine).
108. About Epson, EPSON, https://www.epson.eu/about (last visited Jan. 30, 2018);
Search Results for Xerox, EPSON, https://www.epson.eu/productfinder/xe/en/
content/open/productfinder/index.php?search=xerox (last visited Feb. 9, 2018) (input
"xerox" into website's search engine).
109. About Us, BROTHER, https://www.brother-usa.com/Brother.aspx (last visited
Feb. 9, 2018); Search Results for Xerox, BROTHER, https://www.brother-usa.com/site
search.aspx?SK=xerox&searchBtn4=++&sort=date%3AD%3AL%3Adl&output=xml_
no dtd&oe=UTF-8&ie=UTF8&client=fe wwwcom&proxystylesheet=fewwwcom&site=col www com comin
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Xerox"o and its search results page only referred to Xerox as a brand.
The Elliott decision and the "Who-Are-You/What-Are-You" test gives
both Booking.com and Xerox a stronger defense against claims of
genericness."' The application of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning to the
foregoing facts show a better and more efficient way to analyzing
genericness than the test articulated by the plaintiffs in Elliott.112
III. THE ELLIOTT DECISION AND ITS APPLICATION TO GENERICISM AND
CLAIMS OF GENERICIDE.

A. Application of the Elliott decision: Genericism

The Elliott decision is correct in ruling the use of a trademark as a noun or
as a verb is not relevant to the primary significance analysis.1 3 By focusing
on the public's understanding of the trademark, rather than the public's use
of the mark, the test of genericness becomes more straight-forward. 114 The
Ninth Circuit's "Who-Are-You/What-Are-You" test primarily focuses on
the public's understanding of the trademark and is an efficient way of
analyzing issues of genericness and genericide.1"
This straightforward
approach is supported by the notion that a trademark can serve the dual
function of naming a product and simultaneously indicating its source.116
With the application of the Elliott decision, the question of genericness and
genericide has turned in the favor of trademark owners."

f sol (last visited Feb,. 9, 2018) (input "xerox" into website's search engine).
110. About Dell, DELL, http://www.dell.com/leam/us/en/uscorpl/corp-comm (last
visited Mar. 2, 2018; Dell Search, DELL, http://pilot.search.dell.com/xerox (last visited
Mar. 2, 2018) (input "xerox" into website's search engine).
111. See Goldman, supra note 14 (suggesting that the Elliott decision was a "[b]ig
[w]in" for trademark owners with big brands).
112. See infra notes 148-159, 189-198 and accompanying text.
113. Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017).
114. See id. (holding that the lower court did not misapply the primary significance
test by not recognizing the alleged importance of verb use).
115. See Yellow Cab Co. v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925, 929 (9th
Cir. 2005) (articulating the "Who-Are-You/What-Are-You" analysis); Filipino Yellow
Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ'ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999).
116. See Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1158 (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d
1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 1982)) (stating that the court has already noted that "the mere fact
that consumers order 'a coke,' i.e., used the mark as a noun, failed to show 'what . ..
customers [were] thinking,' or whether they had a particular source in mind").
117. See Goldman, supra note 14 (suggesting that the Elliott decision was a "[b]ig
[w]in" for trademark owners with big brands).
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Dual Function and Verb Usage as It Relates to Genericness

In Elliott, the district court quotes an amendment to the Lanham Act
stating a trademark can serve the dual function of both naming a product
while also indicating its source."' The court's use of this explanation
supports its ruling that irrelevance of verb usage can extend to noun usage." 9
Further, the court acknowledged indiscriminate and discriminate verb use of
"google" in the same sense that a consumer could use the word "coke." 20 If
the treatment of verb usage and noun usage are the same, the inability to use
the mark "Booking.com" to refer to something generically and in a
grammatically coherent way has significantly less weight in the analysis of
genericism.12 Consequently, if the primary significance test were one of
majority usage rather than majority understanding, the analysis of
genericism for this mark would be less efficient because the mark cannot be
used in a grammatically coherent way.1 2 2 Subsequently, evidence that a
majority of the public uses "google" in a generic way is not only insufficient
to support a finding of genericism, but it says very little about the subject
3
matter at all.1 2

The Ninth Circuit holds that even if there were an assumption that the
word could be used, and is used, in a generic and indiscriminate sense, it
would say nothing about the public understanding, which is an assertion that
is mentioned in the Booking.com complaint.1 2 4 While the appeal does not

118. See Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1158 (quoting S. REP. No. 98-627, at 5 (1984)) ("A
trademark can serve a dual function that of [naming] a product while at the same time
indicating its source. Admittedly, if a product is unique, it is more likely that the
trademark adopted and used to identify that product will be used as if it were the
identifying name of that product. But this is not conclusive of whether the mark is
generic.").
119. See id. (stating that Congress' acknowledgement of the dual function has
instructed the court that a consumer could use a trademark as a noun and still use the
trademark to identify the source).
120. Id. at 1159 (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir.
1982)).
121. See Complaint, supra note 88, ¶ 38 (stating that it is impossible to generically
use the mark "Booking.com" in a grammatically coherent way).
122. See id. ¶ 55 (addressing the fact that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found
the mark Booking.com was impossible to use in a grammatically coherent way to refer
generically to anything).
123. See id. (explaining that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board instead broke the
mark "Booking.com" into pieces and speculated about the meanings of the component
pieces and how the consumers understood the meanings in order to determine whether
the mark would be generic, as opposed to trying to figure out how the mark could be
"used" generically).
124. See Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1158 ("If Elliott were correct that a trademark can only
perform its source-identifying function when it is used as an adjective, then we would
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deal with genericide directly, the Ninth Circuit decision may be applied to
determine whether the mark is generic.' 25 Booking.com differs in that the
mark in question involves a gerund and a verb, not a noun like "google."1 2 6
In addition, the Booking. com mark includes a generic mark ("Booking") and
a top level domain (".com").1 27 But it follows that if the evidence of
grammatical generic use of the word does not indicate how the public
primarily understands the word, the lack of ability to grammatically use the
mark generically does not indicate how the public primarily understands the
word.1 28
The application of the Elliott decision, therefore, changes
Booking.com 's argument against genericism because the TTAB does not
need to address the inability to grammatically use the mark in a generic
way.1 29 Without the weight of grammatical genericness, a finding of
genericism rests on the literal application of the "Who-Are-You/What-AreYou" formulation, and not an apparent lack of genericism because the mark
cannot be used grammatically in such a way.130
The uniqueness behind trademarks of domain name registrations is
mentioned in the Booking.com complaint.' 3 '
The plaintiff company
established the uniqueness of combining two generic terms "Booking" and
".com" to create a mark that, by definition cannot be used to signify another
source because it is a URL.13 2 One of the major differences between the
circumstances in the Elliott decision and prior genericism cases is that the
claim of genericism came as a result of a domain name registration

not have cited a need for evidence regarding the customers' inner thought processes.").
125. See id. at 1156 (emphasis added) (stating that plaintiffs claimed "he has
presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the GOOGLE
trademark is generic" and not that it has fallen victim to genericide, suggesting that
"being generic" and "falling victim to genericide" does not have a separate analysis, apart
from the stage at which the claim is made).
126. See Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, No. 1:16-cv-425 (LMB/IDD), 2017 WL
3425167, at *1l (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2017) (finding that "booking" is a generic term for
hotel and travel reservation services, but the mark in question is "Booking.com," not
"booking").
127. Id. at* 16-17.
128. Id.
129. See Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1159 (finding that verb use does not automatically
constitute generic use and cannot sustain a finding of genericness on its own); see also
Complaint, supra note 88, 41.
130. See Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1158 (holding that the correct framework for the primary
significance test is whether the mark to the relevant public is understood as a generic
name for internet search engines, not merely used in a generic way).
131. Complaint, supra note 88, ¶ 55.
132. Id. ¶ 70 ("Because the trademark is also a URL that cannot be used by any other
third parties, it is all but impossible for it to achieve recognition as a generic term.").
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dispute.' 33 This difference is fundamental in that the Google mark, an
internet-based trademark, and its domain name indicates a single source
associated with the mark. 3 4 For example, the mark "VITAMINS.COM," as
a URL, will uniquely distinguish a single website location that no other third
party can link to with a different mark. 3 5 Thus, by definition, the mark is
inherently distinctive and perhaps should not be considered generic.13 6
However, the policy of making any domain name, even generic ones, a
protected trademark can be problematic because it would monopolize
necessary generic terms needed to describe products or services.' 37
Consumers could also still not tell from a purely generic second level
domain, what website it will ultimately lead to. 38 In other words, if the mark
cannot be used in a generic way, then the majority usage test is unhelpful for
determining genericism and the primary significance test must then be based
on majority understanding.' 39 If the primary significance test is based on a
majority understanding, then the issue of application of genericness for a
mark that cannot be used in a logically generic way, would not come up at
all.1 4 0

ii.

Evidence ofPublic Use Versus Evidence ofPublic Understanding

The evidence of the public using the mark "Booking.com" as a way to
refer to a class of services is irrelevant because it cannot be applied to the
mark due to its grammatical nature. 141 Furthermore, the District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia could have reached the same holding without
considering this evidence.1 42 As Elliott explains, Congress indicates in its

133. Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1151.
134. See Sarah E. Akhtar & Robert C. Cumbow, Why Domain Names Are Not
Generic: An Analysis of Why Domain Names IncorporatingGeneric Terms are Entitled
to Trademark Protection, 1 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 226, 227 (1999) (defining
domain names as "ordinary words, letters, or numbers that signify the location of a Web
site on the Internet, such as drugstore.com. Domain names are easily recognizable and,
therefore, powerful").
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 241 (explaining that it "would be against public policy to allow a trademark
owner to assert dilution claims against every domain name registrant whose domain
name comprised part of a trademark that consisted of a generic [second level domain]").
138. See id at 228 (stating that the mark "DRUGSTORE.COM" is arguably generic
because no consumer can identify a source looking solely at the second level domain
mark "DRUGSTORE").
139. Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1159; Complaint supra note 88, ¶ 38.
140. Complaint supra note 88, ¶ 38.
141. Id.
142. See Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, No. 1:16-cv-425 (LMB/IDD), 2017 WL
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amendment to the Lanham Act that a trademark can serve a dual function in
that it can be used grammatically as a noun or verb, and serve a sourceidentifying function.1 43 The TTAB's argument in Booking. com is similar to
the conclusion reached in Elliott.14 4 The evidence regarding the use of the
mark "Booking.com" was in fact irrelevant.1 45 The district court primarily
focused on the plaintiff s evidence that the public understands the trademark
in question to be a specific brand.1 4 6 While the court did analyze the public's
use of the mark, the deciding factor in the mark's protectability was
ultimately the evidence of public understanding, not use.1 4 7 The court relied
heavily on the plaintiff s survey, proving that the public understood the mark
as a specific brand and not a generic name for online booking services.1 48
Despite the court's statement that evidence of use is highly relevant to the
analysis, it relied heavily on the survey evidence that pointed directly to the
public's understanding of the mark rather than how the public used the
mark.1 49

In addition, the plaintiffs in Elliott assert that their usage argument is
supported by their understanding that verbs cannot indicate the source of a
good or service.' The plaintiffs in Elliott argue that verbs cannot indicate
the source of a good or service because it describes an action.'' The
3425167, at *19-20 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2017) (stating that the absence of evidence of
consumer usage of the mark "Booking.com" to refer to a class of services is "highly
relevant").
143. Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1158.
144. See id. at 1161 (stating that even with a favorable inference that the majority of
the public uses the verb "google" to refer to generically searching the internet, it cannot
support a finding of genericide).
145. See Booking. com, 2017 WL 3425167, at *19 (declining the invitation to rely on
theoretical and indirect sources of consumer understanding over direct and persuasive
evidence in a survey that shows how the consuming public understands the mark as a
brand).
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. See id. at * 17 (quoting 2 McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 12:16) (describing the
Plaintiff's Teflon survey, a survey from a source that are the "most widely used format
to resolve a genericness challenge").
149. Id. at *20 (emphasis added) ("Because plaintiffs Teflon survey is the only
evidence . . speak[ing] directly to how consumers understandplaintiff s mark, it weighs
heavily in the secondary meaning analysis and the survey . .. indicates strong brand
awareness.").
150. See Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017),petitionfor cert.filed,
2017 WL 3601395, at *9 (U.S. Aug. 14, 2017) (No. 17-258) ("The Ninth Circuit's first
holding is illogical because verbs cannot indicate the source of a good or a service. A
verb describes an action. It does not identify the item which must be used to perform that
action, let alone that item's producer.").
151. Id.
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plaintiffs also argue that a verb cannot possibly identify either an item or a
source.' 52 If this were the case, then clear and direct evidence that the public
understands the trademark in question as source indicating would be
disregarded.' 5 3 Rejecting evidence of actual primary significance to the
public in favor of a use based doctrine, runs contrary to the language set forth
in the Lanham Act. 5 4 There is no preferential treatment for the use of the
mark in the Lanham Act as an indicator of true primary significance.'
Further, the meaning of the phrase "primary significance" does not suggest
use.' 56 Thirdly, Congress states that a trademark can in fact have dual
function and be used as grammatically as a noun or verb and be used in a
source-identifying sense. ' 7 Finally, the Court's articulation of the primary
significance test as it relates to secondary meaning suggests that primary
significance is mental process, not mere usage.' The Court states "in the
minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature ... is to
identify the source of the product rather than the product itself" 5 9 The
phrase "in the minds" is more compatible with the "Who-Are-You/WhatAre-You" test because it deals with majority understanding. 6 0 Disregarding
evidence of actual majority understanding in favor of majority usage
conflicts with the primary significance language used by both Congress and
the Supreme Court.161

Despite the irrelevance of the lack of grammatically generic uses for the
mark "Booking.com" under the Elliott decision, the strict application of the
"Who-Are-You/What-Are-You" variation of the primary significance test
152. Id.
153. See Booking.com, 2017 WL 3425167, at *23 (stating that a consumer survey
statistician found the survey results indicating that 74.8% of consumers recognize
"Booking.com" as a brand name as strongly establishing that consumers do not perceived
the mark as a generic or common name).
154. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012) ("The primary significance of the registered
mark to the relevant public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for
determining whether the registered mark has become the generic name of goods or
services on or in connection with which it has been used.").
155. See id.

156. Id.; see also Significance, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/significance (last visited Feb. 9, 2018) (defining "significance" as either
(1) "something that is conveyed as meaning often obscurely or indirectly;" (2) "the
quality of conveying or implying;" (3) "the quality of being important" or (4) "the quality
of being statistically significant").
157. Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1158 (quoting S. REP. No. 98-627, at 5 (1984)).
158. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995).
159. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S.
844, 851 n.11 (1982)).
160. See id.; Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1158.
161. Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163; 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).
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will determine that the "Booking.com" mark is not generic.' 62
B. Application of the Elliott decision: Genericide
i.

The Same Bottle ofAspirin: Xerox and Google

The Xerox Corporation's trademark "Xerox" is often used as a verb, and
the company has attempted to combat this by using advertising campaigns
that discourage the use of the word "Xeroxing."'6 3 Under the Ninth Circuit
ruling, the policing of verb usage is no longer necessary, so long as it passes
the "What-Are-You/Who-Are-You" test. 6 4 In order for the Xerox mark to
become generic under the genericide doctrine, the claim must be made in
regard to a particular type of good or service.' 65
Xerox is similar to Google in that the indiscriminate verb usage of the
mark is an act and not an actual good or service. 166 The assumption in Elliott
would be similar to that posed in a genericide case for Xerox.1 6 7 If there is
an assumption that the public uses the verb "Xerox" in a generic and
indiscriminate sense, it says nothing about how the consumers primarily
understand the word, irrespective of its grammatical function.1 68 Congress'
explanation in its amendment to the Lanham Act downplays the importance
of the grammatical use of the mark.1 69 If a trademark can be used as a verb
or noun and still maintain its source indicating function, then evidence of the
verb or noun use cannot be determinative in whether a mark is generic. 7 1
Even if the product is unique and the trademark is eventually used to describe
the product, it is not conclusive regarding the mark's genericness.
162. See Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1158.
163. See Lockhart, supra note 1 (describing techniques used to prevent genericide,
including anti-genericide advertisements, creating a generic name for the branded good,
and consistently using the word "brand" beside the mark).
164. See Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1155 (holding a consumer can use the trademark in either
an indiscriminate sense, with no source in mind, or in a discriminate sense, with the brand
of the product in name without subjecting the term to a finding of a genericide).
165. See id. (finding the framework for genericide is to determine whether the primary
significance of the mark to the public is a generic name for the good or service in
question).
166. See id. at 1158 ("[A]n internet user might use the verb 'google' in an
indiscriminate sense .... ); Mike Hoban, Google This: What It Means When a Brand
Becomes a Verb, FAST COMPANY (Jan. 18, 2013), https://www.fastcompany.com/
3004901 /google-what-it-means-when-brand-becomes-verb (describing an advertisement campaign asking consumers to not use the name "Xerox" as a verb).

167. Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1159.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1158.
170. See id.

171. See id. (quoting S. REP. No. 98-627, at 5 (1984)) ("Admittedly, if a product is
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Consequently, although the Xerox Corporation's founders Joseph C.
Wilson and Chester Carlson invented the photocopier and introduced this
unique product to public consumers, it is still not conclusive to the mark's
genericness when the consumers began to use the word "Xerox" to refer to
photocopiers.172 The Xerox Corporation and Google are similar in the sense
that they are both corporations who were known for their new or relatively
new technology.1 73 Both corporations had services dealing with technology
that were conceptually new to the public, and the public tended to refer to
these services with the affiliated marks "Xerox" and "Google."1 7 4 Applying
the explanation in the amended Lanham Act alone, shows that this is not
enough to deem a trademark as generic. 7 1
ii.

Definition, Verb Usage, and the "Who-Are-You/What-Are-You"
Test

In addition, similar to "google" mark, the dictionary defines "Xerox" as a
the company's trademark first: "a brand name for a copying machine for
reproducing printed, written, or pictorial matter by xerography."1 76 Its noun
and verb meaning only serves as secondary definitions: (1) a copy made on
a xerographic copying machine; and (2) to print or reproduce by
xerography. '
The existence of these secondary definitions, under the
Elliott decision, are irrelevant to the finding of genericide.17
These
unique, it is more likely that the trademark adopted and used to identify that product will
be used as if it were the identifying name of that product. But this is not conclusive of
whether the mark is generic.").
172. See The Story ofXerography 10, XEROX CORP. (Aug. 9,1999), https://www.xero
x.com/downloads/usa/en/innovation/innovationstoryofxerography.pdf (narrating the
invention of xerography by Chester Carlson, a patent attorney, in 1959).
173. See Our Story, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/about/our-story/ (last
visited Feb. 9, 2018) (chronicling the creation of a search engine "Backrub," which
eventually evolved into the popular search engine "Google").
174. See Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1155 (stating the plaintiffs' claim that the relevant public
use the word "google" to refer to search engines); The Story ofXerography, supra note
172 (describing story of the first xerographic machine); Our Story, supra note 173
(describing the creation of the popular search engine Google); Lockhart, supra note 1
(describing Xerox's efforts to combat genericide through policing use of its mark as a
generic verb).
175. S. REP. No. 98-627, at 5 (1984).
176. See Xerox, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/xerox?s=t
(last visited Feb. 9, 2018) (defining Xerox as "a copy made on a xerographic copying
machine," or "to print or reproduce by xerography").
177. Id.
178. See Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017) (concluding that
the dictionary evidence, which only has secondary definitions where google is defined
as a verb, can only support the favorable inference already drawn by the court and does
not support a finding of genericide on its own).
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secondary definitions only support a favorable inference already drawn by
the court: that the public uses the mark in an indiscriminate sense.1 79 The
first definition is a better representation of how the public primarily sees the
mark and is another route to the "Who-Are-You/What-Are-You" test.s0
The Ninth Circuit Court states that instead of presenting examples where
"google" is primarily defined as a generic name for an Internet search engine,
Elliott simply gave secondary definitions.'' It can be inferred from the
court's phrasing and language when discussing the dictionary evidence that
the order of the definitions made a difference.' 82 If the first definition of the
word google had in fact just been a grammatical generic use of the mark, it
would serve as better evidence that the public primarily views the mark as
generic term.183
With the removal of the verb usage as evidence of genericide, the Xerox
Corporation has a straightforward path to defeat genericide claims.
Therefore, the Xerox brand is more like the company in Yellow Cab Co.1 8 4
None of the All-in-One printers"8, including Xerox, lists "Xerox" or
"Xeroxing" in their product description of the machine's functionality:
universally, the word "copy" is used.' 86 In addition, none of the companies
who create the printers mention the words "Xerox" or "Xeroxing" on their
websites.1 7 In Filipino Yellow Pages, when asked the question "What are

179. Id. (explaining that the lower court had assumed that the majority of the public
used the mark google in an indiscriminate sense and, even with this assumption, the
lower court found it could not support a finding of genericide).
180. Id. (suggesting that the fact a trademark is primarily defined as a brand in a
dictionary entry defeats the secondary entry that supports generic usage of the word).
181. Id.
182. See id. at 1161 (emphasis added) ("Elliott does not present any examples where
'google'
is defined as a generic name for Internet search engines.
Instead, Elliott presents secondary definitions where google is defined as a verb.").
183. See id.
184. Yellow Cab Co. v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir.
2005) (reversing summary judgment for a finding of genericness because there was an
expectation that cab companies' answers to the "Who-Are-You/What-Are-You" test
would not be "Yellow Cab" which indicates the mark is seen as brand); All-In-One
Printers,supra note 104 (showing that All-in-One manufacturers do not use mention the
word "xerox", supporting the assertion that these companies would not identify as
"Xerox companies").
185. All-In-One Printers, supra note 104 (showing multiple brands of photocopiers
on an office supply retailer website).
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., About Dell, DELL, http://www.dell.com/leam/us/en/uscorpl/corpcomm (last visited Feb. 9, 2018); see also About Us, HP, http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hpinformation/index.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2018); About, CANON, supra note 106; About,
EPSON, supra note 108; About Us, BROTHER, supra note 109.
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you?" the three companies involved would answer "A Filipino yellow pages"
because they all dealt with contact books, which are normally referred to as
Yellow Pages, that listed Filipino businesses or contacts." Since other
competitors responded to "what are you?" using "Filipino yellow pages," the
term was found to be generic. 8 9 As evidenced by the product descriptions
of various brand name photocopiers and by the websites of the competitions,
it is unlikely that companies that sell photocopiers would answer "a Xerox
company" to the question "what are you?"' 90 This makes the Xerox
Corporation similar to the company in Yellow Cab Co, where the response
to the "what are you?" question in that case was expected to be "a taxicab
company" or "a cab company."' 9' The case of Xerox, the response to "what
are you?" would be expected to be along the lines of a "photocopier
producer" or a "printer manufacturer."' 92
Finally, like in the Elliott case, there is an efficient alternative for the word
"Xerox."' 93 The alternative word can be found in the product descriptions
of the various machines offered in the marketplace: printer, photocopier, or
copier. 194 Without a showing that there is no available substitute for the word
Xerox, a finding of genericness cannot be made because, again, the "claim
of genericide must relate to a particular type of good or service."'95 As
evidenced by the product descriptions, there is in fact an efficient
188. See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ'ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143,
1151 (9th Cir. 1999).
189. See id. (quoting Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental Surgeries, 601 F.2d
1011 (9th Cir. 1979)) ("Giving [Filipino Yellow Pages ("FYP")] exclusive rights to the
term "Filipino Yellow Pages" might be inappropriate because it would effectively 'grant
[FYP as] owner of the mark a monopoly, since a competitor could not describe his goods
as what they are."').
190. See Yellow Cab Co. v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925, 929-30
(9th Cir. 2005) ("Posing the question: "Could you refer me to a yellow cab company?",
one would expect these same companies to point not to themselves, but to a business
operating under the name "Yellow Cab." "Yellow cab" thus appears to answer the "who
are you?" rather than the "what are you?" question, demonstrating its nongenericness.");
All-In-One Printers, supra note 104.
191. See id. ("Posing the question: "Could you refer me to a yellow cab company?",
one would expect these same companies to point not to themselves, but to a business
operating under the name "Yellow Cab.").
192. See id. (stating the exception of a taxicab company to not answer "what are you"
with "a yellow cab company" appears to show that that "Yellow Cab" answers the "who
are you" question, thus showing its non-genericness).
193. See Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing TY Inc.
v. Softbelly's, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 531 (7th Cir. 2003)) (noting that genericide usually
does not occur until there are no efficient alternatives for the mark at issue, and that the
word "internet search engine" is an efficient alternative to the mark google).
194. All-In-One Printers,supra note 104.
195. Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1162.
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alternative. 96 Additionally, like in the Elliott decision, not a single
competitor calls its photocopier a "xeroxer. "197 Therefore, like Google, the
Xerox Corporation's mark is not generic.' 98 The fact that the public uses the
word "Xerox" in an indiscriminate sense cannot support a finding that the
term has become generic.' 99 A claim of genericide for the mark "Xerox"
must relate to the type of good - a photocopier - and framing the issue as
whether the public uses the mark as a noun or a verb is the incorrect analysis
to determine genericide.200
IV.

THE ELLIOTT DECISION, THE INTERNET ERA, AND GOOGLE'S PATH

The Elliott decision is a step towards significantly stronger rights for
trademark owners everywhere. 2 0 1 There are various implications for
establishing stronger trademark rights in the Internet Era.
A. The Internet Era: Domain Name Registration and Genericism
Even if there are a number of policy concerns behind creating stronger
trademark rights, the nature of the Internet calls for special adjustments in
trademark law. Specifically, genericide in domain name registration
disputes should involve a stricter primary significance test.20 2 As the
Booking.com complaint mentions, a domain name trademark using two
generic terms (i.e. "Booking" and ".com") signifies a single source solely by

196. See id. (holding that because there is no evidence that a competitor describes
themselves as "a google" and that the public recognizes the alternative word "intemet
search engine," there is an efficient alternative to the mark "Google"); All-In-One
Printers,supra note 104 (describing photocopying machines using verbs and nouns like
"photocopying," and "photocopiers," as opposed to "xeroxing" or "Xerox machines," in
product descriptions).
197. See Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1162 (holding that because search engine competitors do
not call their searches "googles" there is no showing that there is no available substitute
for the word "google" as a generic term).

198. See id. at 1155.
199. See id. at 1158 (holding that neither indiscriminate or discriminate use of a
trademark can support a finding of genericide).
200. See id. at 1157 (explaining that, because a majority of the evidence of generic
use presented to the court at best support favorable inferences drawn by the court, this
evidence is irrelevant in determining the genericide of a trademark).
201. See Goldman, supra note 14 ("The court emphatically endorsed all of its
practices (and the significant dollars Google spent preparing this case). . . . Other big
brands whose trademarks are often used as verbs or nouns also have a lot of reason to
cheer this ruling.").

202. See Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, No. 1:16-cv-425 (LMB/IDD), 2017 WL
3425167, at * 11, * 19 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2017) (recognizing that consumers recognize the
domain name "Booking.com" as a brand).
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the fact that it is a URL.203 In analyzing the genericism of a fanciful mark in
domain name registration disputes, there must be complete erosion of the
connection between the mark's source and the mark itself such that the mark
has become the primary way to describe the good or service. Evidence of
indiscriminate verb usage should not be used as evidence of genericide in
domain name registration disputes like the one in Elliott.2 04
Both Booking.com and Elliott involve domain name trademarks,
distinguishing them from prior genericide case law. 205 Despite this notable
difference, a monopolization of necessary generic and descriptive terms in
domain name registrations will be problematic. 206 The uniqueness offanciful
marks used in domain name registrations, however, still calls for a stricter
application of the primary significance test because there is a unique single
source space on the web identified with the fanciful mark, regardless of
casual and grammatical generic use in the public domain. 20 7 This difference
arguably makes claims of genericism of a fanciful mark weaker since the
single source of the mark (e.g. "insertfancifulterm.com") has likely already
been registered while the mark was still inherently distinctive and the link
will still be intact. 2 08 Unlike pre-Internet terms such as "aspirin" and
"cellophane," fanciful marks used in a second level domain in the Internet
age are anchored by the link to its website. 20 9 This stricter test for domain
name registration will further the goals of trademark law and protect the
consumers surfing the web. 21 0 An example is The Lego Group's trademark
"Lego," which is a children's toy, and operation of a Lego fan site at domain

203. Complaint, supra note 88, ¶¶ 69-70 (asserting that a URL trademark signifies a
single source and thus cannot be a generic mark by its nature).
204. See id. ¶ 55 (stating that the TTAB found the mark Booking.com could not be
used to refer to generically to anything while being grammatically coherent (e.g. "a
Booking.com," ".Booking.com-ing")).
205. Elliott, 860 F.3d at 1151-52; Booking.com, 2017 WL 3425167, at *9-13.
206. See Akhtar & Cumbow, supra note 134, at 234 (stating that the mark
"PETSTORE.COM" is "arguably generic" because no consumer can identify a source
looking solely at the second level domain mark "PETSTORE").
207. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976) (explaining that arbitrary and fanciful marks are afforded the strongest protection).
208. See Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 80, 80 (Dec.
Comm'r Pat. 1950) (citing evidence of generic and descriptive use without any indication
of the good's origins as one of the reasons the mark "Elevator" was now generic).
209. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 577 (2d Cir.
1963); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1936);
Haughton Elevator Co., 85 U.S.P.Q (BNA) at 80; Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F.
505, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
210. See GIBSON & LALONDE, supra note 3 (stating that protecting trademarks is
important because it help authenticates the source).
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names such as "ratemylego.com."211 The fear of the Lego Group is that use
of their mark in another domain name will cause consumers to think that they
sponsor or own the website in operation.2 12
By restricting the ability for others to use a trademark in the domain name,
consumers are better able to go to the site they intend to visit, rather than a
website that has nothing to do with the source at all. There is room for fair
use of the mark, however: there are arguably good free speech claims in
domain name registrations.213
B. Google's Next Steps
The increased protections for Google's mark are not foolproof. Google,
like any trademark owner, should continue to watch out for genericism.
Under this proposed change, if the Google mark should ever lose its
association with either the subsidiary or the parent company Alphabet in the
public understanding, then the mark cannot be protected, even in domain
name registrations.214 Some linguistic experts estimate that the mark Google
is heading toward genericization.215 Alphabet should continue to diversify
the brand Google with different products under the Alphabet holding
corporation2 and utilizing brand content strategies217 in light of the
structural changes of Google's corporate structure and its other upcoming

211. See Deven R.Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism
Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1840-41 (2007) (describing The Lego Group's
letter to a website operator that claims the use of their trademark "Lego" in the domain
name registration constitutes trademark infringement).
212. Id.
213. See Darryl C. Wilson, Battle Galactica: Recent Advances and Retreats in the
Strugglefor the Preservationof TrademarkRights on the Internet, 12 J. HIGH TECH. L.
1, 54 (2011) (describing a case involving a gripe site using the trademark name in the
domain name that found in favor of the domain name usage).
214. See Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017) (suggesting that
if the primary dictionary definition of "google" was "an Internet search engine," the
dictionary evidence would be sufficient to find for genericide).
215. See James B. Stewart, Even in the New Alphabet, Google Keeps Its Capital G,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/business/even-inthe-new-alphabet-google-keeps-its-capital-g.html?_r=0 (describing the generic use of
the word "google" in publications about dating, in the media, in the American Dialect
Society, and in dictionaries).
216. See Bernard Cova, Re-brandingBrand Genericide, 57 Bus. HORIZONS 359, 362
(2014) (describing the strategy of a company producing different categories of products
bearing the same brand name in order to combat the risk of genericide of a particular
good or service).
217. See id. at 363 (explaining that a wide range brand content strategies from radio
to social media networks can allow companies to act as editors and guide conversations
and interactions relating to the brand).
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ventures into new markets. 2 18 These strategies will likely become more and
more important as Alphabet continues to grow other businesses under its
Alphabet brand, as opposed to its subsidiary brand, Google. 2 19
V. CONCLUSION

The Elliott decision is a change of direction arguably facilitated by the
Internet Era. The Ninth Circuit decision to devalue the evidence of generic
use will change the way claims of genericness are viewed and how the
inherent distinctiveness of a mark is defended. It will also significantly
strengthen a company's defense to genericism and will likely decrease the
number of challenges pertaining to an arbitrary mark's distinctiveness. The
inherently distinctive requirement calls for claims of genericism to relate to
the good or service, and according to the Ninth Circuit articulation, that all
but eliminates the usefulness of evidence of indiscriminate use and creates a
stricter primary significance test and stronger rights for trademark owners.

218. See Stewart, supra note 215 (discussing Google's threat of genericism in light of
the company transitioning to alphabet, specifically stating that "[v]entures like Nest,
which makes home thermostats and alarms, and Calico, a life sciences company focused
on longevity, are not Google-branded, and will be separate companies free to develop
their own brands operating under the Alphabet holding company").
219. See id. ("Ifthe day comes when Google is deemed a generic term, the Alphabet
holding company and these companies - and any new trademarks they develop - will
be unaffected. In the meantime, 'Alphabet' is all but immune from genericization.
Google may pervade much of our lives, but one thing it will surely never control is the
letters of the English language.").

